www.stl.nps.navy.mil/c4i/cyberwar.html


   CYBERWAR IS COMING! 


   John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt 

   International Policy Department RAND 
   Copyright 1993 Taylor & Francis 
   ISSN 0149-5933/93 
   
   This article is copyrighted 1993 by Taylor & Francis, 1900
   Frost Road, Suite 101, Bristol, PA 19007, 1-800-821-8312.

   It was originally published in the journal Comparative Strategy,
   Volume 12, no. 2, pp. 141-165. Electronic reproduction and transmission
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   ABSTRACT

   The information revolution and related organizational innovations are
   altering the nature of conflict and the kinds of military structures,
   doctrines, and strategies that will be needed. This study introduces
   two concepts for thinking about these issues: "cyberwar" and "netwar."

   Industrialization led to attritional warfare by massive armies (e.g.,
   World War I).  Mechanization led to maneuver predominated by tanks
   (e.g., World War II). The information revolution implies the rise of
   cyberwar, in which neither mass nor mobility will decide outcomes;
   instead, the side that knows more, that can disperse the fog of war
   yet enshroud an adversary in it, will enjoy decisive advantages.

   Communications and intelligence have always been important. At
   a minimum, cyberwar implies that they will grow more so and will
   develop as adjuncts to overall military strategy. In this sense,
   it resembles existing notions of "information war" that emphasize
   C3I. However, the information revolution may imply overarching
   effects that necessitate substantial modifications to military
   organization and force posture. Cyberwar may be to the twenty first
   century what blitzkrieg was to the twentieth. It may also provide
   a way for the U.S. military to increase "punch" with less "paunch."
   Whereas cyberwar refers to knowledge-related conflict at the military
   level, netwar applies to societal struggles most often associated with
   low intensity conflict by non-state actors, such as terrorists, drug
   cartels, or black market proliferators of weapons of mass destruction.
   Both concepts imply that future conflicts will be fought more by
   "networks" than by "hierarchies," and that whoever masters the network
   form will gain major advantages. "Knowledge must become capability." --
   Carl von Clausewitz, On War

   EMERGENT MODES OF CONFLICT

   Suppose that war looked like this: Small numbers of light, highly
   mobile forces defeat and compel the surrender of large masses of
   heavily armed, dug-in enemy forces, with little loss of life on
   either side. The mobile forces can do this because they are well
   prepared, make room for maneuver, concentrate their firepower
   rapidly in unexpected places, and have superior command, control,
   and information systems that are decentralized to allow tactical
   initiatives, yet provide central commanders with unparalleled
   intelligence and "topsight" for strategic purposes. Warfare is no
   longer primarily a function of who puts the most capital, labor, and
   technology on the battlefield, but of who has the best information
   about the battlefield. What distinguishes the victors is their grasp
   of information--not only from the mundane standpoint of knowing how to
   find the enemy while keeping it in the dark, but also in doctrinal and
   organizational terms. The analogy is rather like a chess game where
   you see the entire board, but your opponent sees only his own pieces;
   you can win even if he is allowed to start with additional powerful
   pieces. We might appear to be extrapolating from the U.S. victory
   in the Persian Gulf war against Iraq. But our vision is inspired
   more by the example of the Mongols of the thirteenth century. Their
   "hordes" were almost always outnumbered by their opponents, yet they
   conquered, and held for over a century, the largest continental empire
   ever seen. The key to Mongol success was their absolute dominance
   of battlefield information. They struck when and where they deemed
   appropriate, and their "arrow riders" kept field commanders, often
   separated by hundreds of miles, in daily communication. Even the Great
   Khan, sometimes thousands of miles away, was aware of developments
   in the field within days of their occurrence.  Absent the galvanizing
   threat that used to be posed by the Soviet Union, domestic political
   pressures will encourage the United States to make do with a smaller
   military in the future. The type of war- fighting capability that we
   envision, which is inspired by the Mongol example, but drawn mainly
   from our analysis of the information revolution, may allow America to
   protect itself and its far-flung friends and interests, regardless of
   the size and strength of our potential future adversaries. The Advance
   of Technology and Know-How Throughout history, military doctrine,
   organization, and strategy have continually undergone profound changes,
   owing in part to technological breakthroughs. The Greek phalanx,
   the combination of gun and sail, the levee en masse, the blitzkrieg,
   the Strategic Air Command: history is filled with examples in which
   new weapon, propulsion, communication, and transportation technologies
   provided a basis for advantageous shifts in doctrine, organization,
   and strategy that enabled innovators to avoid exhausting attritional
   battles and pursue instead a form of "decisive" warfare.[1] 
   
   Today,
   a variety of new technologies are again taking hold, and further
   innovations are on the way. The most enticing include non- nuclear
   high-explosives, precision-guided munitions, stealth designs for
   aircraft, tanks, and ships, radio-electronic combat (REC) systems,
   new electronics for intelligence-gathering, interference, and
   deception, new information and communications systems that improve
   command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) functions,
   and futuristic designs for space-based weapons and for automated
   and robotic warfare. In addition, virtual reality systems are being
   developed for simulation and training. Many of these advances enter
   into a current notion of a military technology revolution (MTR).[2]

   The future of war--specifically the U.S. ability to anticipate and
   wage war--will be shaped in part by how these technological advances
   are assessed and adopted. Yet, as military historians frequently warn,
   technology permeates war but does not govern it. It is not technology
   per se, but rather the organization of technology, broadly defined,
   that is important. Russell Weigley describes the situation this way:
   "... the technology of war does not consist only of instruments
   intended primarily for the waging of war. A society's ability to wage
   war depends on every facet of its technology: its roads, its transport
   vehicles, its agriculture, its industry, and its methods of organizing
   its technology. As Van Creveld puts it, 'behind military hardware
   there is hardware in general, and behind that there is technology
   as a certain kind of know-how, as a way of looking at the world and
   coping with its problems.'"[3] 
   
   In our view, the technological shift
   that matches this broad view is the information revolution. This
   is what will bring the next major shift in the nature of conflict
   and warfare. Effects of the Information Revolution The information
   revolution reflects the advance of computerized information and
   communications technologies and related innovations in organization
   and management theory. Sea-changes are occurring in how information
   is collected, stored, processed, communicated, and presented, and
   in how organizations are designed to take advantage of increased
   information.[4] Information is becoming a strategic resource that
   may prove as valuable and influential in the post- industrial
   era as capital and labor have been in the industrial age. Advanced
   information and communications systems, properly applied, can improve
   the efficiency of many kinds of activities. But improved efficiency is
   not the only, or even the best, possible effect. The new technology
   is also having a transforming effect, for it disrupts old ways of
   thinking and operating, provides capabilities to do things differently,
   and suggests how some things may be done better if done differently:
   "The consequences of new technology can be usefully thought of as
   first-level, or efficiency, effects and second-level, or social system,
   effects. The history of previous technologies demonstrates that early
   in the life of a new technology, people are likely to emphasize the
   efficiency effects and underestimate or overlook potential social
   system effects. Advances in networking technologies now make it
   possible to think of people, as well as databases and processors,
   as resources on a network. "Many organizations today are installing
   electronic networks for first-level efficiency reasons. Executives now
   beginning to deploy electronic mail and other network applications can
   realize efficiency gains such as reduced elapsed time for transactions.
   If we look beyond efficiency at behavioral and organizational changes,
   we'll see where the second-level leverage is likely to be. These
   technologies can change how people spend their time and what and who
   they know and care about. The full range of payoffs, and the dilemmas,
   will come from how the technologies affect how people can think and
   work together--the second-level effects" (Sproull and Kiesler, 1991:
   15- 16). The information revolution, in both its technological and
   non- technological aspects, sets in motion forces that challenge the
   design of many institutions. It disrupts and erodes the hierarchies
   around which institutions are normally designed. It diffuses and
   redistributes power, often to the benefit of what may be considered
   weaker, smaller actors. It crosses borders, and redraws the boundaries
   of offices and responsibilities. It expands the spatial and temporal
   horizons that actors should take into account. Thus, it generally
   compels closed systems to open up. But while this may make life
   difficult, especially for large, bureaucratic, aging institutions, the
   institutional form per se is not becoming obsolete. Institutions of all
   types remain essential to the organization of society. The responsive,
   capable institutions will adapt their structures and processes to the
   information age. Many will evolve from traditional hierarchical forms
   to new, flexible, network-like models of organization. Success will
   depend on learning to interlace hierarchical and network principles.[5]
   Meanwhile, the very changes that trouble institutions, such as
   the erosion of hierarchy, favor the rise of multi-organizational
   networks. Indeed, the information revolution is strengthening the
   importance of all forms of networks, such as social networks and
   communications networks. The network form is very different from the
   institutional form. While institutions (large ones, in particular) are
   traditionally built around hierarchies and aim to act on their own,
   multi-organizational networks consist of (often small) organizations
   or parts of institutions that have linked together to act jointly. The
   information revolution favors the growth of such networks by making
   it possible for diverse, dispersed actors to communicate, consult,
   coordinate, and operate together across greater distances, and on
   the basis of more and better information than ever before.[6] These
   points bear directly on the future of the military, and of conflict
   and warfare more generally.  Both Netwar and Cyberwar Are Likely The
   thesis of this thinkpiece is that the information revolution will cause
   shifts, both in how societies may come into conflict and how their
   armed forces may wage war. We offer a distinction between what we call
   "netwar"--societal-level ideational conflicts waged in part through
   internetted modes of communication--and "cyberwar" at the military
   level. These terms are admittedly novel, and better ones may yet be
   devised.[7] But, for now, they help illuminate a useful distinction,
   and identify the breadth of ways in which the information revolution
   may alter the nature of conflict short of war, as well as the context
   and the conduct of warfare.[8] While both netwar and cyberwar revolve
   around information and communications matters, at a deeper level they
   are forms of war about "knowledge," about who knows what, when, where,
   and why, and about how secure a society or a military is regarding
   its knowledge of itself and its adversaries.[9] Explaining Netwar
   Netwar refers to information-related conflict at a grand level between
   nations or societies. It means trying to disrupt, damage, or modify
   what a target population knows or thinks it knows about itself and
   the world around it. A netwar may focus on public or elite opinion,
   or both. It may involve public diplomacy measures, propaganda and
   psychological campaigns, political and cultural subversion, deception
   of or interference with local media, infiltration of computer networks
   and databases, and efforts to promote dissident or opposition movements
   across computer networks. Thus, designing a strategy for netwar may
   mean grouping together from a new perspective a number of measures
   that have been used before but were viewed separately. In other
   words, netwar represents a new entry on the spectrum of conflict that
   spans economic, political, and social, as well as military forms of
   "war." In contrast to economic wars that target the production and
   distribution of goods, and political wars that aim at the leadership
   and institutions of a government, netwars would be distinguished by
   their targeting of information and communications. Like other forms
   on this spectrum, netwars would be largely non- military, but they
   could have dimensions that overlap into military war. For example,
   an economic war may involve trade restrictions, the dumping of goods,
   the illicit penetration and subversion of businesses and markets in a
   target country, and the theft of technology, none of which need involve
   the armed forces. Yet an economic war may also come to include an armed
   blockade or strategic bombing of economic assets, meaning it has also
   become a military war. In like manner, a netwar that leads to targeting
   an enemy's military C3I capabilities turns, at least in part, into what
   we mean by cyberwar. Netwar will take various forms, depending on the
   actors. Some may occur between the governments of rival nation-states.
   In some respects, the U.S. and Cuban governments are already engaged in
   a netwar. This is manifested in the activities of Radio and TV Marti
   on the U.S. side, and on Castro's side by the activities of pro-Cuban
   support networks around the world. Other kinds of netwar may arise
   between governments and non-state actors. For example, netwar may be
   waged by governments against illicit groups and organizations involved
   in terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or drug
   smuggling. Or, to the contrary, it may be waged against the policies
   of specific governments by advocacy groups and movements, involving,
   for example, environmental, human-rights, or religious issues. The
   non-state actors may or may not be associated with nations, and in
   some cases they may be organized into vast transnational networks and
   coalitions. Another kind of netwar may occur between rival non-state
   actors, with governments maneuvering on the sidelines to prevent
   collateral damage to national interests and perhaps to support one
   side or another. This is the most speculative kind of netwar, but
   the elements for it have already appeared, especially among advocacy
   movements around the world. Some movements are increasingly organizing
   into cross-border networks and coalitions, identifying more with the
   development of civil society (even global civil society) than with
   nation-states, and using advanced information and communications
   technologies to strengthen their activities. This may well turn out
   to be the next great frontier for ideological conflict, and netwar may
   be a prime characteristic. Most netwars will probably be non-violent,
   but in the worst cases one could combine the possibilities into some
   mean low-intensity conflict scenarios. Martin Van Creveld (1991:
   197) does this when he worries that, "In the future, war will not
   be waged by armies but by groups whom today we call terrorists,
   guerrillas, bandits and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit on
   more formal titles to describe themselves." In his view, war between
   states will diminish, and the state may become obsolete as a major
   form of societal organization. Our views coincide with many of Van
   Creveld's, though we do not believe that the state is even potentially
   obsolete. Rather, it will be transformed by these developments. Some
   netwars will involve military issues. Possible issue areas include
   nuclear proliferation, drug smuggling, and anti-terrorism because of
   the potential threats they pose to international order and national
   security interests.  Moreover, broader societal trends (e.g., the
   redefinition of security concepts, the new roles of advocacy groups,
   the blurring of traditional boundaries between what is military and
   what is non-military, between what is public and what is private,
   and between what pertains to the state and what pertains to society)
   may engage the interests of at least some military offices in some
   netwar-related activities. Netwars are not real wars, traditionally
   defined. But netwar might be developed into an instrument for trying,
   early on, to prevent a real war from arising. Deterrence in a chaotic
   world may become as much a function of one's cyber posture and presence
   as of one's force posture and presence. Explaining Cyberwar Cyberwar
   refers to conducting, and preparing to conduct, military operations
   according to information-related principles. It means disrupting,
   if not destroying, information and communications systems, broadly
   defined to include even military culture, on which an adversary relies
   in order to know itself: who it is, where it is, what it can do when,
   why it is fighting, which threats to counter first, and so forth. It
   means trying to know everything about an adversary while keeping
   the adversary from knowing much about oneself. It means turning the
   "balance of information and knowledge" in one's favor, especially
   if the balance of forces is not.  It means using knowledge so that
   less capital and labor may have to be expended. This form of warfare
   may involve diverse technologies, notably for C3I, for intelligence
   collection, processing, and distribution, for tactical communications,
   positioning, and identification-friend-or- foe (IFF), and for "smart"
   weapons systems, to give but a few examples. It may also involve
   electronically blinding, jamming, deceiving, overloading, and intruding
   into an adversary's information and communications circuits. Yet,
   cyberwar is not simply a set of measures based on technology. And it
   should not be confused with past meanings of computerized, automated,
   robotic, or electronic warfare. Cyberwar may have broad ramifications
   for military organization and doctrine. As noted, the literature on
   the information revolution calls for organizational innovations, so
   that different parts of an institution function like interconnected
   networks rather than separate hierarchies. Thus, cyberwar may
   imply some institutional redesign for a military in both intra- and
   inter-service areas. Moving to networked structures may require some
   decentralization of command and control, which may well be resisted in
   light of earlier views that the new technology would provide greater
   central control of military operations. But decentralization is only
   part of the picture: the new technology may also provide greater
   "topsight," a central understanding of the big picture that enhances
   the management of complexity.[10] Many treatments of organizational
   redesign laud decentralization; yet decentralization alone is not the
   key issue. The pairing of decentralization with topsight brings the
   real gains. Cyberwar may also imply developing new doctrines about the
   kinds of forces needed, where and how to deploy them, and what and how
   to strike on the enemy's side.  How and where to position what kinds
   of computers and related sensors, networks, databases, and so forth.,
   may become as important as the question once was for the deployment
   of bombers and their support functions. Cyberwar may also have
   implications for integrating the political and psychological with the
   military aspects of warfare. In sum, cyberwar may raise broad issues
   of military organization and doctrine, as well as strategy, tactics,
   and weapons design. It may be applicable in low- and high-intensity
   conflicts, in conventional and non-conventional environments, and
   for defensive or offensive purposes.  As an innovation in warfare,
   we anticipate that cyberwar may be to the twenty first century what
   blitzkrieg was to the twentieth century. Yet, for now, we also believe
   that the concept is too speculative for precise definition. At a
   minimum, it represents an extension of the traditional importance
   of obtaining information in war: having superior C3I and trying to
   locate, read, surprise, and deceive the enemy before he does the same
   to you. That remains important no matter what overall strategy is
   pursued. In this sense, the concept means that information-related
   factors are more important than ever due to new technologies, but it
   does not indicate a break with tradition. Indeed, it resembles Thomas
   Rona's (1976: 2) concept of an "information war" that is "intertwined
   with, and superimposed on, other military operations." Our concept is
   broader than Rona's, which focused on countermeasures to degrade an
   enemy's weapons systems while protecting one's own; yet, we believe
   that this approach to defining cyberwar will ultimately prove too
   limiting. In a deeper sense, cyberwar signifies a transformation
   in the nature of war. This, we believe, will prove to be the better
   approach to defining cyberwar. Our position is at odds with a view
   (see Arnett 1992) that uses the terms "hyperwar" and "cyberwar" to
   claim that the key implication of the MTR is the automated battlefield,
   that future wars will be fought mainly by "brilliant" weapons, robots,
   and autonomous computers, that man will be subordinate to the machine,
   and that combat will be unusually fast and laden with stand-off
   attacks. This view errs in its understanding of the effects of the
   information revolution, and our own view differs on every point.
   Cyberwar is about organization as much as technology. It implies
   new man-machine interfaces that amplify man's capabilities, not a
   separation of man and machine. In some situations, combat may be waged
   fast and from afar, but in many other situations, it may be slow and
   close-in. New combinations of far and close and fast and slow may be
   the norm, not one extreme or the other. The post-modern battlefield
   stands to be fundamentally altered by the information technology
   revolution, at both the strategic and tactical levels. The increasing
   breadth and depth of this battlefield and the ever-improving accuracy
   and destructiveness of even conventional munitions have heightened
   the importance of C3I matters to the point where dominance in this
   aspect alone may now yield consistent war- winning advantages
   to able practitioners. Yet cyberwar is a much broader idea than
   attacking an enemy's C3I systems while improving and defending one's
   own. In Clausewitz's sense, it is characterized by the effort to
   turn knowledge into capability. Indeed, even though its full design
   and implementation requires advanced technology, cyberwar is not
   reliant upon advanced technology per se. The continued development of
   advanced information and communications technologies is crucial for
   U.S. military capabilities. But cyberwar, whether waged by the United
   States or other actors, does not necessarily require the presence of
   advanced technology. The organizational and psychological dimensions
   may be as important as the technical. Cyberwar may actually be waged
   with low technology under some circumstances. 
   
   INFORMATION-RELATED FACTORS IN MILITARY HISTORY 
   
   Our contention is that netwar and cyberwar
   represent new (and related) modes of conflict that will be increasingly
   important in the future. The information revolution implies--indeed, it
   assures--that a sea-change is occurring in the nature of conflict and
   warfare. Yet both new modes have many historical antecedents; efforts
   have been made in the direction of conducting warfare from cyber-like
   perspectives in the past. Information, communications, and control are
   enduring concerns of warfighters. There is much historical evidence,
   tactical and strategic, that attempting to pierce the "fog of war"
   and envelop one's foe in it has played a continuing role.[11] In the
   Second Punic War of the third century B.C., Carthaginian forces under
   the command of Hannibal routinely stationed observers with mirrors on
   hilltops, keeping their leader apprised of Roman movements, while the
   latter remained ignorant of his. Better communications contributed
   significantly to the ability of Hannibal's forces to win a string
   of victories over a 16-year period. In the most dramatic example of
   the use of superior information, Hannibal's relatively small forces
   were able rise literally from the fog of war at Lake Trasimene to
   destroy a Roman army more than twice its size.[12] Another famous,
   more recent example, occurred during the Napoleonic Wars. The British
   Royal Navy's undisputed command of the Mediterranean Sea, won at
   the Battle of the Nile in 1798, cut the strategic sea communications
   of Bonaparte's expeditionary force in North Africa, leading to its
   disastrous defeat.  The invaders were stranded in Egypt without
   supplies or their commander, after Napoleon's flight, where they
   remained until the British came to take them prisoner. A few years
   later in the same conflict, Lord Cochrane's lone British frigate was
   able to put French forces into total confusion along virtually the
   entire Mediterranean coast of occupied Spain and much of France. The
   French relied for their communications on a semaphore system to alert
   their troops to trouble and to tell coastal vessels when they could
   safely sail. Cochrane raided these signalling stations, then struck
   spectacularly, often in conjunction with Spanish guerrilla forces,
   while French communications were disrupted.[13] Story upon story
   could be drawn from military history to illuminate the significance
   of information and communications factors. But this is meant to be
   only a brief paper to posit the concept of cyberwar. Better we turn
   directly to an early example, a virtual model of this upcoming mode of
   warfare. The Mongols: An Early Example of Cyberwar Efforts to strike
   at the enemy's communications and ensure the safety of one's own are
   found, to varying degrees, throughout history. Yet the Mongol way
   of warfare, which reached its zenith in the twelfth and thirteenth
   centuries, may be the closest that anyone has come to waging pure
   cyberwar (or netwar, for that matter). Examining Mongol military praxis
   should, therefore, be instructive in developing the foundations for
   waging war in a like manner in the post-modern world. The Mongol
   example also reinforces the point that cyberwar does not depend
   on high technology, but rather on how one thinks about conflict
   and strategic interaction. At the military level, Mongol doctrine
   relied for success almost entirely on learning exactly where their
   enemies were, while keeping their own whereabouts a secret until they
   attacked. This enabled them, despite a chronic inferiority in numbers,
   to overthrow the finest, largest armies of Imperial China, Islam,
   and Christendom. The simplest way to illustrate their advantage is
   to suggest an analogy with chess: war against the Mongols resembled
   playing against an opponent who can hide the dispositions of his
   pieces, but who can see the placement of both his and yours. Under such
   conditions, the player with knowledge of both sides' deployments could
   be expected to triumph with many fewer pieces.  Moreover, the addition
   of even significant forces to the semi-blinded side would generate
   no requirement for a similar increase on the "sighted" side. (Thus,
   the similarity is not so much to chess as to its cousin, kriegspiel,
   in which both players start "blind" to their opponent's position. In
   our analogy, one player can see through the barrier that is normally
   placed between the boards of the players.) So it was with the
   Mongols. In one of their greatest campaigns, against the mighty
   Muslim empire of Khwarizm (located approximately on the territory
   of today's Iran, Iraq, and portions of the Central Asian republics
   of the former Soviet Union), a Mongol army of some 125,000 toppled a
   foe whose standing armies amounted to nearly half a million troops,
   with a similar number of reserves. How could this happen? The answer is
   that the Mongols identified the linear, forward dispositions of their
   foes and avoided them. Instead, they worked around the defenders,
   making a point of waylaying messengers moving between the capital
   and the front. Muhammad Ali Shah, the ruler of Khwarizm, took the
   silence from the front as a good sign, until one day a messenger,
   having narrowly escaped a Mongol patrol, made his way into the capital,
   Samarkand. Muhammad inquired about the news from his army and was told
   that the frontier was holding. The messenger went on to add, however,
   that he had observed a large Mongol army but a day's march from the
   capital. The shah fled and his capital fell swiftly. This news, when
   given to the frontier armies, led to a general capitulation. Muhammad
   ended his days in hiding on the island of Abeshkum in the Caspian
   Sea, where he contracted and died from pleurisy. The campaign against
   Khwarizm is typical of the Mongol strategic approach of first blinding
   an opponent, then striking at his heart (i.e., going for checkmate).
   Battles were infrequently fought, as they were often unnecessary for
   achieving war aims. There were times, however, when confrontations
   could not be avoided. When this happened, the Mongols relied heavily on
   coordinated operations designed to break down the plans and controls
   of their opponents. Against the Polish-Prussian coalition forces at
   the battle of Liegnitz, for example, the Mongols engaged and defeated
   an army some four times their size. Their success was based on keeping
   a clear picture of the defending coalition's order of battle, while
   confusing the opponents as to their own whereabouts. Thus, portions of
   the Western army chased after small detachments that were simple lures,
   and ended up in the clutches of the Mongol main force. The Poles and
   Prussians were defeated piecemeal. Indeed, the Mongols were so sure of
   their information that they repeatedly used a river crossing during the
   battle in the intervals between its use by the Poles and Prussians.[14]
   What about Mongol advantages in mobility and firepower? Certainly,
   their ability to move a division some 80 miles per day was superior
   to other armies, and their horn bows did outrange those of their
   enemies by 50-100 yards, on average. But neither of thes factors
   could offset their foes advantages in fortification technology,
   and the body armor of Western forces gave them distinct advantages
   over the Mongols in close combat. Thus, Mongol tactical operations
   were often significantly stymied by defended cities,[15] and close
   engagements were exceedingly hard fought, with the Mongols suffering
   heavily. Indeed, the ferocity and effectiveness of the Prusso-Polish
   forces at Liegnitz, especially their cavalry, may have deterred the
   Mongols from continuing their invasion of Europe.[16] At the battle of
   Hims, the Mamelukes showed that the forces of Islam could also defeat
   the Mongols tactically. What neither Islam nor Christendom could do
   consistently, however, was outwit the Mongols strategically. Clearly,
   the key to Mongol success was superior command, control, communication,
   and intelligence. Scouts and messengers always took along three or
   four extra horses, tethered, so that they could switch mounts and
   keep riding when one grew tired.  This gave the Mongol horsemen,
   in relative terms, something approximating an ability to provide
   real-time intelligence, almost as from a satellite, on the enemy's
   order of battle and intentions. At the same time, this steppe-version
   of the pony express (the Khan called them "arrow riders") enabled field
   generals to keep the high command, often thousands of miles from the
   theater of war, informed as to all developments within four or five
   days of their occurrence. For communication between field forces, the
   Mongols also employed a sophisticated semaphore system that allowed
   for swift tactical shifts as circumstances demanded. Organizationally,
   the Mongols emphasized decentralized command in the field, unlike
   their foes who were generally required to wait for orders from their
   capitals. Yet by developing a communication system that kept their
   leadership apprised at all times, the Mongols enjoyed topsight as well
   as decentralization.  The Khan "advanced his armies on a wide front,
   controlling them with a highly developed system of communication";
   that was the secret of his success (Chambers 1985:43). In strategic
   terms, the Mongols aimed first to disrupt an enemy's communications,
   then to strike at his heart.  Unlike Clausewitz, they put little store
   in the need to destroy enemy forces before advancing. Also, Mongol
   campaigns were in no way "linear." They struck where they wished, when
   circumstances were deemed favorable. That their Christian and Muslim
   foes seldom emulated the Mongol's organizational and communication
   techniques is to their great discredit. When, finally, the Mamelukes
   defeated the Mongols attempted invasion of Egypt, it was because they
   kept track of Mongol movements and were led in the field by their king,
   Kilawan, who exercised rapid, effective control of his forces in the
   fluid battle situations that ensued. Also, the Mamelukes, employing
   carrier pigeons, had developed faster strategic communications than
   even the Mongols' arrow riders, allowing them to mass troops in time to
   defend effectively.[17] As much as they form a paradigm for cyberwar,
   the Mongols were also adept at netwar. Early in their campaigns,
   they used terror tactics to weaken resistance. At the outset of any
   invasion, they broadcast that any city that resisted would be razed
   and its inhabitants slaughtered.  Surrender, on the other hand, would
   result simply in coming under Mongol suzerainty; this entailed some
   initial rape and pillage, but thereafter settled into a distracted sort
   of occupation. As a result, peaceful surrenders were plentiful. In
   later campaigns, when the Mongols learned that both Christians and
   Muslims saw them as the dark forces of Gog and Magog, heralding the
   "end of times," they deliberately cultivated this image. They renamed
   themselves Tartars, as though they were the minions of "tartarum,"
   the biblical nether world.  Later, when it was clear that the world was
   not ending, the Mongols willingly adopted both Christianity and Islam,
   whichever eased the burden of captivity for particular peoples. This
   utilitarian approach to religion impeded the formation of opposing
   coalitions. Some analysts have argued that the Mongols represent
   an early experiment with blitzkrieg.[18] In our view, however, the
   differences between cyberwar and blitzkrieg are significant, and
   the Mongols reflect the former more than the latter. Blitzkrieg,
   People's War, and Beyond The relative importance of war against
   an enemy's command, control, and communications increased with the
   advent of mechanized warfare. In World War II, the German blitzkrieg
   doctrine--in some ways a forerunner of cyberwar--made the disruption of
   enemy communications and control an explicit goal at both the tactical
   and strategic levels. For example, the availability of radios in
   all of its tanks provided Germany with a tactical-force multiplier
   in its long war with the Soviet Union, whose tanks, though more
   numerous and better built, provided radios only for commanders.[19]
   At the strategic level, the destruction of the Soviets' central
   communications and control site, by capturing Moscow, was a key element
   of the planning for Operation Barbarossa. But when an opportunity
   arose during the campaign to win large material gains in the Ukraine,
   Hitler diverted General Guderian's panzers away from their approach to
   Moscow, and it was never taken. There would be no "lightning" victory
   for the Germans, who soon found themselves on the weaker side of a
   massive attritional struggle, doomed to defeat.[20] Following WWII,
   information and communication technologies improved greatly in the
   major industrialized nations, and the important wars with lessons
   for cyberwar were between these nations and the underdeveloped ones
   of the Third World. A comparison of two key conflicts illuminates
   the growing importance and applicability of cyberwar principles: the
   one a peoples' war waged by North Vietnam and the Viet Cong in the
   1960s and 1970s, and the recent, more conventional conflict between
   the American-led coalition and Iraq. Both wars represent turning
   points. In the case of Vietnam, the enemy may have applied cyber
   principles more effectively than did the United States, not only in
   military areas, but also where cyberwar cuts into the political and
   societal dimensions of conflict. In the case of the war against Iraq,
   the United States did superior work applying cyberwar principles
   (they were not called that at the time, of course) against an enemy
   whose organization, doctrine, strategy, and tactics were from a
   different era. In the Vietnam war, the United States appeared to have
   advantages up and down the chain of command and control, from the
   construction of quantitative indicators and computerized models and
   databases for analyzing the course of the war in Washington, through
   field radios for calling in prompt airstrikes, reinforcements, and
   rescue operations. But the thrall of computerization and quantitative
   techniques led analysts to overlook the softer, subtler aspects of the
   war where the enemy was winning. The excellence of U.S. communications
   capabilities encouraged inappropriate intrusion from above into battles
   and campaigns best planned and waged within the theater. While U.S.
   forces had superior tactical communications, the guerrillas'
   strategic communications were largely unaffected. Meanwhile, the
   North Vietnamese and Viet Cong operated on Mao Zedong's doctrine that
   "command must be centralized for strategical purposes and decentralized
   for tactical purposes" (Mao 1961: 114)[21]--a classic combination of
   topsight and decentralization. The United States, on the other hand,
   appears to have allowed the timely availability of vast quantities
   of information at high levels to seduce leadership into maintaining
   central tactical as well as strategic control, and into believing that
   they had topsight when they did not. The Vietnam example illustrates
   our point that good communications, though they provide necessary
   conditions, are insufficient to enable one to fight a cyberwar. For
   this endeavor, a doctrinal view of the overarching importance and
   value of maintaining one's own communications, while disabling the
   adversary's, is requisite. This entails the development of tactics
   and operational strategies that discard the basic tenets of both
   set-piece and even traditional maneuver warfighting theories. Neither
   the grinding attritional approach of Grant nor the explosive thrusts
   of Guderian will suffice. Instead, radically different models must be
   considered that focus upon the objective of systemically disorganizing
   the enemy.  To some extent, the recent American experience in the Gulf
   War suggests that an increasing sensitivity to cyber principles is
   taking hold.  First, it was made quite clear by President Bush that
   he had no intention of micro-managing tactical or even operationally
   strategic actions. This is, in itself, a stark contrast to the classic
   image of President Johnson poring over maps of North Vietnam, selecting
   each of the targets to be hit by Operation Rolling Thunder. The
   military operations brought significant cyber elements into play,
   often utilizing them as "force multipliers" (Powell 1992). The Apache
   helicopter strike against Iraqi air defense controls at the war's
   outset is but one, albeit very important, example. Also, the allied
   coalition had good knowledge of Iraqi dispositions, while the latter
   were forced to fight virtually blind. Along these lines, a further
   example of the force multiplying effect of command of information is
   provided by the ability of a relatively small (less than 20,000 troops)
   Marine force afloat to draw away from the landward front and tie down
   roughly 125,000 Iraqi defenders. A significant effort was also made
   to employ netwar principles in the Gulf war. The construction of an
   international consensus against the Iraqi aggression, backed by the
   deployment of large, mechanized forces, was intended to persuade Saddam
   Hussein to retreat. His intransigent behavior suggests that his vision
   of war was of a prior generation. An Implication: Institutions Versus
   Networks >From a traditional standpoint, a military is an institution
   that fields armed forces. The form that all institutions normally
   take is the hierarchy, and militaries in particular depend heavily
   on hierarchy. Yet, the information revolution is bound to erode
   hierarchies and redraw the boundaries around which institutions
   and their offices are normally built. Moreover, the information
   revolution favors organizational network designs. These points
   were made in the first section of this paper. This second section
   leads to related insights, based on a quick review of history. The
   Mongols, a classic example of an ancient force that fought according
   to cyberwar principles, were organized more like a network than a
   hierarchy. More recently, a relatively minor military power that
   defeated a great modern power--the combined forces of North Vietnam
   and the Viet Cong--operated in many respects more like a network
   than an institution; it even extended political- support networks
   abroad. In both cases, the Mongols and the Vietnamese, their defeated
   opponents were large institutions whose forces were designed to
   fight set-piece attritional battles. To this may be added a further
   set of observations drawn from current events. Most adversaries that
   the United States and its allies face in the realm of low-intensity
   conflict, such as international terrorists, guerrilla insurgents,
   drug smuggling cartels, ethnic factions, as well as racial and tribal
   gangs, are all organized like networks (although their leadership may
   be quite hierarchical).  Perhaps a reason that military (and police)
   institutions have difficulty engaging in low-intensity conflicts is
   because they are not meant to be fought by institutions. The lesson:
   Institutions can be defeated by networks, and it may take networks to
   counter networks. The future may belong to whoever masters the network
   form. ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE The implications of a revolutionary
   technology are often not widely perceived at first. That was true
   of the tank, the machine gun, and the telephone. For example, with
   their newly developed, rapid firing mitrailleuse, the French enjoyed
   a tremendous potential firepower advantage over the Prussians in
   1870. Unfortunately, this early version of the machine gun looked
   more like a fieldpiece instead of a rifle, and it was deployed
   behind the front with the artillery.  Thus, the weapon that would
   dominate World War I a generation later had almost no effect on
   the Franco-Prussian conflict. People try to fit new technology into
   established ways of doing things; it is expected to prove itself in
   terms of existing standards of efficiency and effectiveness. It may
   take time to realize that inserting new technology into old ways may
   create some new inefficiencies, even as some activities become more
   efficient. It may take still more time to realize that the activity
   itself, in both its operational and organizational dimensions,
   should be restructured, even transformed, in order to realize the
   full potential of the technology.[22] This pattern is documented in
   the early histories of the telephone and the electric motor, and is
   being repeated with computer applications in the business world. Why
   should anything different be expected for cyberwar? New information
   technology applications have begun to transform the business world
   both operationally and organizationally. The government world is,
   for the most part, moving slowly in adopting the information
   technology revolution. One might expect the military world to lag
   behind both the business and government worlds, partly because
   of its greater dependence on hierarchical traditions. But in
   fact, parts of the U.S. military are showing a keen interest in
   applying the information revolution. As this unfolds, a constant,
   but often halting, contentious interplay between operational and
   organizational innovations should be expected. Growing Awareness
   of the Information Revolution An awareness is spreading in some
   U.S. military circles that the information revolution may transform
   the nature of warfare. One hears that the MTR implies a period of
   re-evaluation and experimentation not unlike the one in the 1920s
   and 1930s that resulted in Germany's breakthrough formulation of
   the blitzkrieg doctrine. New questions are being asked about how to
   apply the new technology in innovative ways. For example, one set of
   arguments holds that the MTR may increasingly enable armed forces to
   stand off and destroy enemy targets with high precision weapons fired
   from great distances, including from outer space. But, another set
   holds that the information revolution may drive conflict and warfare
   toward the low-intensity end of the scale, giving rise to new forms
   of close-in combat. Clearly, military analysts and strategists are
   just beginning to identify the questions and call for the required
   thinking. The military, like much of the business world, remains in
   a stage of installing pieces of the new technology to make specific
   operations more effective. Indeed, techniques that we presume would
   be essential to cyberwar may be used to improve the cost-effectiveness
   of many military operations, no matter what overall strategy is being
   pursued (even if cyberwar remains unformulated). For example, improved
   surveillance and intelligence-gathering capabilities that help identify
   timely opportunities for surprise (to some extent, a purpose of the
   new Joint Targeting Network (JTN) can be of service to a traditional
   attritional warfare strategy. Also, new capabilities for informing the
   members of a unit in real time about where their comrades are located
   and what each is doing, as in recent experiments with inter-vehicular
   information systems (IVIS, may improve the ability to concentrate force
   as a unit, and maintain that concentration throughout an operation. The
   list of new techniques that could be mentioned is long and growing. We
   favor inquiring methodically into how the information revolution may
   provide specific new technical capabilities for warfare, regardless
   of the doctrine and strategy used. We also favor analyzing what kinds
   of operational and organizational innovations should be considered
   in light of such capabilities. And we recognize that it is quite
   another thing to try to leap ahead and propose that cyberwar may be
   a major part of the answer. But this thinkpiece is not meant to be so
   methodical; it is meant to be speculative and suggestive, in order to
   call attention to the possibility of cyberwar as a topic that merits
   further discussion and research. Indications and Aspects of Cyberwar
   New theoretical ground needs to be broken regarding the information
   and communications dimensions of war, and the role of "knowledge" in
   conflict environments. Cyberwar is not merely a new set of operational
   techniques. It is emerging, in our view, as a new mode of warfare that
   will call for new approaches to plans and strategies, and new forms of
   doctrine and organization. What would a cyberwar look like? Are there
   different types? What may be the distinctive attributes of cyberwar
   as a doctrine? Where does cyberwar fit in the history of warfare,
   and why would it represent a radical shift? What are the requirements
   and options for preparing for and conducting a cyberwar? Will it enable
   power to be projected in new ways? What are the roles of organizational
   and technological factors, and what other factors (e.g., psychological)
   should be considered? How could the concept enable one to think better,
   or at least differently in a useful way, about factors, such as C3I,
   REC (radio-electronic combat systems), and psywar, that are important
   but not ordinarily considered together? What measures of effectiveness
   (MOE) should be used? These kinds of questions, some of which are
   touched on in this paper, call for examination. Paradigm Shift We
   anticipate that cyberwar, like war in Clausewitz's view, may be a
   "chameleon." It will be adaptable to varying contexts; it will not
   represent or impose a single, structured approach. Cyberwar may be
   fought offensively and defensively, at the strategic or tactical
   levels. It will span the gamut of intensity, from conflicts waged by
   heavy mechanized forces across wide theaters, to counterinsurgencies
   where "the mobility of the boot" may be the prime means of maneuver.
   Consider briefly the context of blitzkrieg. This doctrine for offensive
   operations, based on the close coordination of mobile armored forces
   and air power, was designed for relatively open terrain and good
   weather. Its primary asset was speed; swift breakthroughs were sought,
   and swift follow-ups required to prevent effective defensive ripostes.
   "The blitzkrieg is predicated upon the assumption that the opponent's
   army is a large and complex machine that is geared to fighting along
   a well-established defensive line. In the machine's rear lies a
   vulnerable network, which comprises numerous lines of communication,
   along which supplies as well as information move, and key nodal
   points at which the various lines intersect. Destruction of this
   central nervous system is tantamount to destruction of the army. The
   principal aim of a blitzkrieg is therefore to effect a strategic
   penetration. The attacker attempts to pierce the defender's front
   and then to drive deep into the defender's rear, severing his lines
   of communication and destroying key junctures in the network."[23]
   By comparison, cyberwar takes a different view of what constitutes the
   "battlefield." Cyberwar depends less on the geographic terrain than on
   the nature of the electronic "cyberspace,"[24] which should be open to
   domination through advanced technology applications. Cyberwar benefits
   from an open radio-electronic spectrum and good atmospheric and other
   conditions for utilizing that spectrum. Cyberwar may require speedy
   flows of information and communications, but not necessarily a speedy
   or heavily armed offense like blitzkrieg. If the opponent is blinded,
   it can do little against even a slow-moving adversary. How, when,
   and where to position battlefield computers and related sensors,
   communications networks, databases, and REC devices may become as
   important in future wars as the same questions were for tanks or bomber
   fleets and their supporting equipment in the World War II. Cyberwar may
   imply a new view, not only of what constitutes "attack," but also of
   "defeat."  Throughout the era of modern nation-states, beginning about
   the sixteenth century, attrition has been the main mode of warfare. An
   enemy's armed forces had to be defeated before objectives could
   be taken. This lasted for centuries until the grotesque, massive
   slaughters of World War I led to a search for relief from wars
   of exhaustion. This in turn led to the development of blitzkrieg,
   which circumvented the more brutish aspects of attritional war. Yet
   this maneuver-oriented doctrine still required the destruction of the
   enemy's forces as the prerequisite to achieving war aims; attritional
   war had simply been "put on wheels." Cyberwar may also imply (although
   we are not sure at this point) that victory can be attained without
   the need to destroy an opposing force. The Mongol defeat of Khwarizm
   is the best example of the almost total circumvention and virtual
   dismemberment of an enemy's forces. It is possible to see in cyberwar
   an approach to conflict that allows for decisive campaigning without
   a succession of bloody battles. Cyberwar may thus be developed as
   a post-industrial doctrine that differs from the industrial-age
   traditions of attritional warfare. It may even seek to avoid
   attritional conflict.[25] In the best circumstances, wars may be won
   by striking at the strategic heart of an opponent's cyber structures,
   his systems of knowledge, information, and communications. It is hard
   to think of any kind of warfare as humane, but a fully articulated
   cyberwar doctrine might allow the development of a capability to use
   force not only in ways that minimize the costs to oneself, but which
   also allow victory to be achieved without the need to maximize the
   destruction of the enemy. If for no other reason, this potential
   of cyberwar to lessen war's cruelty demands its careful study and
   elaboration. Organizational and Related Strategic Considerations
   At the strategic level, cyberwar may imply Mao's military ideal of
   combining strategic centralization and tactical decentralization. The
   interplay between these effects is one of the more complex facets of
   the information revolution. Our preliminary view is that the benefits
   of decentralization may be enhanced if, to balance the possible loss
   of centralization, the high command gains topsight, the term mentioned
   earlier that we currently favor to describe the view of the overall
   conflict. This term carries with it an implication that temptations to
   micro-manage will be resisted. The new technology tends to produce a
   deluge of information that must be taken in, filtered, and integrated
   in real time. Informational overload and bottlenecking has long been
   a vulnerability of centralized, hierarchical structures for command
   and control.[26] Waging cyberwar may require major innovations in
   organizational design, in particular a shift from hierarchies to
   networks. The traditional reliance on hierarchical designs may have
   to be adapted to network-oriented models to allow greater flexibility,
   lateral connectivity, and teamwork across institutional boundaries. The
   traditional emphasis on command and control, a key strength of
   hierarchy, may have to give way to an emphasis on consultation and
   coordination, the crucial building blocks of network designs. This
   may raise transitional concerns about how to maintain institutional
   traditions, as various parts become networked with other parts (if
   not with other, outside institutions) in ways that may go "against
   the grain" of existing hierarchies. The information revolution has
   already raised issues for inter- and intra-service linkages, and in
   the case of coalition warfare, for inter-military linkages. Cyberwar
   doctrine may require such linkages. It may call for particularly close
   communication, consultation and coordination between the officers
   in charge of strategy, plans, and operations, and those in charge
   of C3I, not to mention units in the field. Operational and tactical
   command in cyberwar may be exceptionally demanding. There may be
   little of the traditional chain of command to evaluate every move
   and issue each new order. Commanders, from corps to company levels,
   may be required to operate with great latitude. But if they are allowed
   to act more autonomously than ever, they may also have to act more
   as a part of integrated joint operations. Topsight may have to be
   distributed to facilitate this. Also, the types and composition of
   units may undergo striking changes. Instead of divisions, brigades and
   battalions, cyberwar may require the creation of combined-arms task
   forces from each of the services, something akin to the current Marine
   Air-Ground Task Force. There are many historical examples of innovative
   tinkering with units during wartime, going back to the creation of
   the Roman maniple as a counter to the phalanx. In modern times, World
   War II brought the rise of many types of units never before seen. For
   example, the U.S. Army began using combat commands or teams comprised
   of artillery- armor-infantry mixes. The German equivalent was the
   kampfgruppe. These kinds of units could often fulfill missions for
   which larger bodies, even corps, had previously failed. The U.S. Navy
   was also an innovator in this area, creating the task force as its
   basic operating unit in the Pacific War. Our point here is that
   what have often been viewed as makeshift wartime organizational
   adjustments should now be viewed as a peacetime goal of our standing
   forces, to be achieved before the onset of the next war. Force Size
   Considerations A cyberwar doctrine and accompanying organizational
   and operational changes may allow for reductions in the overall size
   of the U.S. armed forces. But if the history of earlier sea-changes
   in the nature of warfighting is any guide, long-term prospects for
   significant reductions are problematic. All revolutions in warfare
   have created advantages that became subject to fairly rapid "wasting,"
   since successful innovations were quickly copied.[27] If both sides
   to a future conflict possess substantial cyberwar capabilities, the
   intensity and complexity of that war may well require more rather
   than fewer forces. The better trained, more skillful practitioner
   may prevail, but it is likely that "big battalions" will still be
   necessary, especially as the relative cyberwar-fighting proficiency of
   combatants nears parity. In any case, whether future U.S. forces are
   larger or smaller, they will surely be configured quite differently.
   Operational and Tactical Considerations Cyberwar may also have radical
   implications at the operational and tactical levels. Traditionally,
   military operations have been divisible into categories of "holding
   and hitting." Part of a force is used to tie down an opponent, freeing
   other assets for flank and other forms of maneuvering attacks.[28]
   Tactically, two key aspects of warfighting have been fire and movement.
   Covering fire allows maneuver, with maneuver units then firing to
   allow fellow units to move. Fire creates maneuver potential. Tactical
   advance is viewed as a sort of leapfrogging affair. Cyberwar may give
   rise to different, if not opposite, principles. Superior knowledge
   and control of information are likely to allow for "hitting without
   holding," strategically, and for tactical maneuvers that create
   optimal conditions for subsequent fire. Nuclear Considerations What
   of nuclear weapons and cyberwar? Future wars that may involve the
   United States will probably be non-nuclear, for two reasons. First,
   the dismantling of the Soviet Union is likely to persist, with
   further arms reductions making nuclear war highly unlikely. Second,
   the United States is ill-advised to make nuclear threats against non-
   nuclear powers.  Besides the lack of central threat and the normative
   inhibitions against using nuclear forces for coercive purposes, there
   is also a practical reason for eschewing them in this context: bullying
   could drive an opponent into the arms of a nuclear protector, or spur
   proliferation by the threatened party. However, even a successful
   proliferator will prefer to keep conflicts conventional, as the
   United States will continue to maintain overwhelming counterforce
   and countervalue advantages over all nascent nuclear adversaries.
   Therefore, the likelihood that future wars, even major ones, will be
   non-nuclear adds all the more reason to make an effort to optimize our
   capabilities for conventional and unconventional wars by developing a
   cyberwar doctrine. In the body of strategic and operational thought
   surrounding war with weapons of mass destruction, an antecedent
   of cyberwar is provided. Nuclear counterforce strategies were
   very much interested in destroying the key communications centers
   of the opponent, thereby making it impossible for him to command
   and control far-flung nuclear weapons. The "decapitation" of an
   opponent's leadership was an inherently cyber principle. The dilemmas
   of mutual deterrence forced this insight into warfighting to remain
   in a suspended state for some decades. Before leaving nuclear issues,
   we would note an exception in the case of naval warfare. Because the
   United States enjoys an overwhelming maritime pre-eminence, it is
   logical that our potential adversaries may seek ways to diminish or
   extinguish it. Nuclear weapons may thus grow attractive to opponents
   whose navies are small, if the pursuit of their aims requires
   nullifying our sealift capabilities. A century ago, the French Jeune
   Ecole, by developing swift vessels capable of launching a brand new
   weapon, the torpedo, sought to counter the Royal Navy's power in
   international affairs. Today, latter-day navalists of continental
   or minor powers may be driven to seek their own new weapons.[29]
   Fortunately, the U.S. Navy has been following a path that elevates the
   information and communication dimensions of war to high importance.
   For, at sea, to be located is to become immediately vulnerable to
   destruction. In fact, naval war may already be arriving at a doctrine
   that looks a lot like cyberwar. There may be deep historical reasons
   for this, in that our naval examples, even from the Napoleonic period,
   have a strong cyber character. Suggested Next Steps for Research Our
   ideas here are preliminary and tentative and leave many issues to be
   sorted out for analysis. Yet we are convinced that these are exciting
   times for rethinking the theory and practice of warfare, and that
   cyberwar should be one of the subjects of that rethinking. This is
   based on our assumption that technological and related organizational
   innovations will continue moving in revolutionary directions. We
   suggest case studies to clarify what ought to be taken into account
   in developing a cyberwar perspective. As noted earlier, these case
   studies should include the Vietnam and Gulf conflicts. Combined with
   other materials (e.g., literature reviews, interviews) about the
   potential effects of the information revolution, such studies may help
   to identify the theoretical and operational principles for developing
   a framework that serves not only for analysis, but potentially also for
   the formulation of a doctrine that may apply from strategic to tactical
   levels, and to high- and low- intensity levels of conflict. Such
   studies may also help distinguish between the technological and the
   non-technological underpinnings of cyberwar. We suggest analytical
   exercises to identify what cyberwar, and the different modalities of
   cyberwar, may look like in the early twenty- first century when the new
   technologies should be more advanced, reliable, and internetted than
   at present. These exercises should consider opponents that the United
   States may face in high- and low- intensity conflicts. The list might
   include armed forces of the former Soviet Union, North Korea, Iraq,
   Iran, and Cuba. Cyberwar against a country's command structure may
   have a special potency when the country is headed by a dictator whose
   base of national support is narrow.[30] Non-state actors should also
   be considered as opponents, including some millennialist, terrorist,
   and criminal (e.g., drug smuggling) organizations that cut across
   national boundaries. We expect that both cyberwar and netwar may be
   uniquely suited to fighting non-state actors. Moreover, we suggest
   that the exercises consider some potentially unusual opponents and
   countermeasures. The revolutionary forces of the future may consist
   increasingly of wide-spread multi- organizational networks that have
   no particular national identity, claim to arise from civil society, and
   include aggressive groups and individuals who are keenly adept at using
   advanced technology for communications, as well as munitions. How will
   we deal with that? Can cyberwar (not to mention netwar) be developed
   as an appropriate, effective response? Do formal institutions have so
   much difficulty combatting informal networks, as noted earlier, that
   the United States may want to design new kinds of military units and
   capabilities for engaging in network warfare? All of the foregoing may
   lead to requirements for new kinds of net assessments regarding U.S.
   cyberwar capabilities relative to those of our potential opponents. How
   much of an advantage does the United States have at present? How
   long will the advantage persist? Such assessments should compare
   not only the capabilities of all parties to wage and/or withstand
   a cyberwar, but also their abilities to learn, identify and work
   around an opponent's vulnerabilities. Finally, despite the inherently
   futuristic tone of this thinkpiece, two dangers are developing in the
   world that may be countered through the skillful application of netwar
   and cyberwar techniques. The first comes from the proliferation of
   weapons of mass destruction. While the specifics of acquisition and
   timetables for development of credible, secure arsenals are open
   to debate, American opposition to proliferation is unquestioned;
   effective action must be taken now to forestall or prevent it. The
   prospects for proliferation in the post-cold war era create a highly
   appropriate issue area for the application of netwar techniques,
   since suasion will be much preferred to the use of preventive
   force[31] in dealing with most nation-state actors (including
   Germany and Japan, should either ever desire its own nuclear
   weapons). A netwar designed to dissuade potential proliferators
   from acquiring such weapons might consist of a "full court press"
   along the many networks of communication that link us to them,
   including diplomatic, academic, commercial, journalistic, and private
   avenues of interconnection. The ideational aspect of the netwar would
   concentrate on convincing potential proliferators that they have no
   need for such weapons. Obtaining them would create new enemies and
   new risks to their survival, while the benefits would be minuscule
   and fleeting. The second danger likely to arise in the post-cold war
   world is to regional security. American defense spending is likely to
   continue decreasing for at least the next decade. U.S.  forces will be
   drawn down, and overseas deployments curtailed. The number of air wings
   and carrier battle groups will decrease. Each of these developments
   spells a lessened American capability to effect successful deterrence
   against conventional aggression. From South Korea to the South Asian
   sub-continent, from the Persian Gulf to the Balkans and across the
   territory of the former Soviet satellites to the Baltic Sea, American
   forward presence will vary between modest and nonexistent. Indeed,
   when we consider the likely rise of age-old ideological, religious,
   ethnic and territorial rivalries, we see a world in which regional
   deterrence is going to be a problematic practice. If regional wars
   are likely, and if American forces will be fewer and farther away
   from most regions than in the past, then a cyberwar doctrine may
   help to compensate for problems of distance and small force size. If
   we are correct about the implications of cyberwar, that traditional
   force requirements against opponents varying in size and strength
   no longer hold, then the United States ought to be able to hurl back
   aggressors when it chooses, even with relatively small forces. General
   Colin Powell summarizes the essence of this notion succinctly, based
   on his analysis of the Gulf War: "A downsized force and a shrinking
   defense budget result in an increased reliance on technology, which
   must provide the force multiplier required to ensure a viable military
   deterrent.... Battlefield information systems became the ally of the
   warrior. They did much more than provide a service.  Personal computers
   were force multipliers." (Powell, 1992). While a cyberwar doctrine
   should provide us with robust war-fighting capabilities against
   the largest regional aggressors, we must recognize that the small
   size and (perhaps) unusual look of our forces may have less of an
   "intimidation effect" on our future adversaries, thereby vitiating
   crisis and deterrence stability. There are two ways to mitigate this
   emergent dilemma. First, applying netwar techniques in regions that
   bear upon our interests may provide early warning signals, and an
   opportunity to dissuade a potential aggressor as soon as we become
   aware of his intentions. The second means of shoring up regional
   deterrence consists of signalling our resolve tacitly. This may involve
   the deployment or "show" of military force quite early in a crisis, and
   could even include the exemplary use of our military capabilities.[32]
   Indeed, if this sort of signalling was aimed at targets suggested
   by cyberwar doctrine, such as critical communication nodes, the
   aggressor's capabilities for offensive action might come close to
   being nil from the outset. What might a cyberwar against a regional
   aggressor look like? In most cases, it may well follow a "Pusan-Inchon"
   pattern.[33] First, the aggressor's "knockout blow" would have to be
   blunted. Then, American forces would counterattack. The burden of
   preventing a complete overrun at the outset of a war would surely
   fall heavily upon the U.S. Air Force and its ability to knock out
   the attacker's communications and logistics. The details will vary
   across regions, as some attackers may be more vulnerable to strategic
   paralysis than others. For example, future Iraqi aggression against
   the Arabian peninsula would depend on its ability to use a few roads
   and two bridges across the Tigris River. On the other hand, North
   Korea has many avenues of advance to the south. The forces needed
   to roll back aggression would likely be modest in size. Since the
   invader will have been blinded by the time U.S. ground forces arrive,
   the latter will be able to strike where and when they wish. On the
   Arabian peninsula, for example, even an invading army of a million
   men would not be able to hold out against an American cyberwar,
   particularly if a defensive lodgement had been maintained. The
   attacker, not knowing where the Americans might strike, would have
   to disperse his forces over a theater measured in many hundreds of
   kilometers in each direction.  American air power would blind him,
   and destroy his forces attempting to maneuver. Then, counterattacking
   forces would strike where least expected, destroying the invader's
   very ability to fight as a cohesive force. As the Mongols defeated
   an army some ten times their size in the campaign against Khwarizm,
   so modern cyberwarriors should be able routinely to defeat much larger
   forces in the field. Of course, details will vary by region. Again,
   the Korean example would be a bit more complicated, although the lack
   of strategic depth on that peninsula is more than offset by robust
   South Korean defensive capabilities. It seems clear that a cyberwar
   doctrine will give its able practitioner the capability to defeat
   conventional regional aggression between nation states decisively,
   at low cost in blood and treasure. Will it fare as well against
   unconventional adversaries? This is a crucial question, as many,
   notably Van Creveld (1991), have argued that war is being transformed
   by non-state actors, and by smaller states that must ever think of
   new ways to fight and defeat their betters. Thus, crises will likely
   be characterized by large, well-armed irregular forces, taking maximum
   advantage of familiar terrain, motivated by religious, ethnic or tribal
   zeal. Finally, they may move easily within and between the "membranes"
   of fractionated states. Cyberwar may not provide a panacea for all
   conflicts of this type, but it does create a new, useful framework
   for coping with them. For example, in the former Yugoslavia, where
   all of the above factors have manifested themselves, the U.S. Army's
   AirLand Battle, or even Operation Desert Storm, should not be used as
   models for analysis. These frames of reference lead to thinking that
   an entire field army (400,000-500,000 troops) is the appropriate tool
   for decisive warfighting in this environment. Instead, an intervention
   could easily follow cyberwar's Pusan-Inchon approach to regional
   conflict. For example, indigenous defenders in Bosnia and other areas
   of the former Yugoslavia could be armed so that they could prevent
   any sort of overrun (the campaign's "Pusan"). Next, a small combined
   arms American task force, including no more than a division of ground
   troops,[34] might strike opportunistically where and when it chose
   (the "Inchon"). Enemy forces would be easily locatable from the air,
   from radio intercepts, and by unmanned ground sensors, especially if
   they try to move or fight. The fact that the aggressors are dispersed
   makes them easier to defeat in detail. If they concentrate, they fall
   prey to tremendous American firepower. The Balkan crisis may prove to
   be a framing event for future unconventional conflicts. It may also
   provide an important case for developing cyberwar doctrine in this
   sort of setting. We note, however, that our assessment does not imply
   support for intervention in this case. While the advent of cyberwar
   enables us to feel more comfortable about the prospects for maintaining
   regional security in an era likely to be characterized by American
   force drawdowns and withdrawals, there is another concern associated
   with this sort of warfighting capability. Should the United States
   seek out coalition partners when it fights future regional wars? It
   seems obvious that we should, since both international and domestic
   political problems are mitigated by the vision of a group of nations
   marching arm in arm, if not in step, against an aggressor. However,
   we should be concerned about trying to incorporate other nations'
   armed forces into a cyberwar campaign. Aside from difficulties with
   integration, the United States should not be in any hurry to share
   a new approach, particularly with allies who may have been recruited
   on an ad hoc basis. It's one thing to take a long-standing ally like
   Britain into our confidence; Syria is quite another matter. Perhaps
   this new tension can be resolved by having our allies defend the
   lodgements, the "Pusans," while we engage in the "Inchons." It is
   ironic that our ability to fight and win wars in accordance with the
   principles of the information revolution may require us to withhold
   our new- found insights, even from our friends and allies.

   
   ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
   
   The authors thank Carl Builder, Gordon McCormick, Jonathan Pollack, Ken
   Watman, and Dean Wilkening for their comments on earlier drafts. This
   article does not represent the views of RAND, its management, or any
   of its sponsors.

   
   FOOTNOTES 

[1] Delbruck (1985 edn.) describes warfare as a
   dual phenomenon: it may be waged with either "exhaustion" or
   "annihilation" in mind. 
[2] This notion borrows from an earlier Soviet
   notion of a scientific technology revolution (STR). 
[3] Weigley (1989:
   196), quoting Van Creveld, (1989: 1). 
[4] See Bell (1980), Beniger
   (1986), and Toffler (1990). 
[5] The literature on these points is vast.
   Recent additions include: Bankes and Builder (1991), Malone and Rockart
   (September 1991); Ronfeldt (1991); Sproull and Keisler (1991, and
   September 1991); Toffler (1990). 
[6] Ronfeldt, "Institutions, Markets,
   and Networks," in preparation. 
[7] Terms with "cyber-" as the
   prefix--e.g., cyberspace--are currently in vogue among some visionaries
   and technologists who are seeking names for new concepts related to the
   information revolution. The prefix is from the Greek root kybernan,
   meaning to steer or govern, and a related word kybernetes, meaning
   pilot, governor, or helmsman. The prefix was introduced by Norbert
   Wiener in the 1940s in his classic works creating the field of
   "cybernetics" (which is related to cybernetique, an older French word
   meaning the art of government). Some readers may object to our
   additions to the lexicon, but we prefer them to alternative terms like
   "information warfare," which has been used in some circles to refer to
   warfare that focuses on C3I capabilities. In our view, a case exists
   for using the prefix in that it bridges the fields of information and
   governance better than does any other available prefix or term. Indeed,
   kybernan, the root of "cyber-" is also the root of the word "govern"
   and its extensions. Perhaps rendering the term in German would help. A
   likely term would be leitenkrieg, which translates loosely as "control
   warfare" (Our thanks to Denise Quigley for suggesting this term). 
[8]
   We are indebted to Carl Builder for observing that the information
   revolution may have as much impact on the context as on the conduct of
   warfare, and that an analyst ought to identify how the context may
   change before he or she declares how a military's conduct should
   change. 
[9] The difficult term is "information;" defining it remains a
   key problem of the information revolution. While no current definition
   is satisfactory, as a rule many analysts subscribe to a hierarchy with
   data at the bottom, information in the middle, and knowledge at the top
   (some would add wisdom above that). Like many analysts, we often use
   the term information (or information-related) to refer collectively to
   the hierarchy, but sometimes we use the term to mean something more
   than data but less than knowledge. Finally, one spreading view holds
   that new information amounts to "any difference that makes a
   difference." 
[10] The importance of topsight is identified by Gelernter
   (1991: 52), who observes: "If you're a software designer and you can't
   master and subdue monumental complexity, you're dead: your machines
   don't work. They run for a while and then sputter to a halt, or they
   never run at all. Hence, 'managing complexity' must be your goal. Or,
   we can describe exactly the same goal in a more positive light. We can
   call it the pursuit of topsight. Topsight--an understanding of the big
   picture is an essential goal of every software builder. It's also the
   most precious intellectual commodity known to man." 
[11] Van Creveld
   (1985:264) puts it this way: "From Plato to NATO, the history of
   command in war consists essentially of an endless quest for
   certainty..." 
[12] See Caven (1980). 
[13] Brodie (1944) and Grimble
   (1978) describe Cochrane's methods in some detail. 
[14] Chambers (1985)
   is the principal reference to Mongol military doctrine for this paper.
   Curtin (1908) translated the original Mongol sagas, rendering them with
   eloquence and coherence. Lamb (1927) remains an important exposition of
   Genghis Khan's approach to strategy. 
[15] Perhaps this is why the
   Mongols slaughtered besieged forces (and civilian supporters) who
   resisted their attacks. As word of this brutality spread, fewer cities
   resisted (a gruesome example of netwar). 
[16] Domestic political strife
   within the Mongol empire also played a part in halting operations. 
[17]
   Kilawan also showed sensitivity to the importance of command and
   control at the tactical level. At the outset of the battle of Hims, for
   example, he sent one of his officers, feigning desertion, over to the
   Mongol commander, Mangku-Temur. When close enough, the Mameluke officer
   struck Temur in the face with his sword. At the same moment the
   Mamelukes attacked. The Mongol staff officers, tending to Temur, were
   thus distracted during the crucial, opening phase of the battle, which
   contributed to their defeat. See Chambers (1985: 160-162). 
[18] See
   Liddell Hart (1931), wherein his early formulation of armored maneuver
   warfare mentions the Mongols as a possible model for blitzkrieg. 
[19]
   The memoirs of Guderian (1972) and Mellenthin (1976) are replete with
   examples of how radio communication allowed German armor to concentrate
   fire until a target was destroyed, then shift to a new target. In
   particular, fire would be initially concentrated on enemy tanks flying
   command pennants, as the Germans were aware of the radio deficiencies
   of their foes. Though the Russians were heavily victimized by
   communication inferiority, even France, with its superior numbers of
   heavier armed tanks, suffered in 1940 because, while all armor had
   radios, only command vehicles could transmit. The French also suffered
   because they deployed their tanks evenly along the front instead of
   counterconcentrating them. Finally, it is interesting to note that
   Guderian began his career as a communications officer. 
[20] Stolfi
   (1992) contends that the German "right turn" into the Ukraine fatally
   compromised Hitler's only chance of winning a war with the Soviet Union
   by striking at the heart of its strategic communications. Liddell Hart
   (1970:157-170) refers to the debate over whether to attack Moscow
   directly, or to destroy Soviet field armies, as the "battle of the
   theories," which was won by the "proponents of military orthodoxy."
   
[21] Mao (1961) bases his theoretical point about guerrilla warfare on
   his experience in fighting the Japanese who, as the Americans would in
   Vietnam, focused primarily on the disruption of tactical
   communications. Miles (1968) echoes Mao's point in his analysis of the
   same conflict. Lawrence's (1938) analysis of the Desert Revolt is also
   confirmatory. 
[22] See the earlier quotation from Sproull and Kiesler
   (1991). 
[23] Posen (1984: 36). 
[24] This is another new term that some
   visionaries and practitioners have begun using. For example, see
   Benedikt (1991). It comes from the seminal "cyberpunk" science-fiction
   novel by Gibson (1984). It is the most encompassing of the terms being
   tried out for naming the new realm of electronic knowledge,
   information, and communications-- parts of which exist in the hardware
   and software at specific sites, other parts in the transmissions
   flowing through cables or through air and space. General Powell (1992)
   nods in this direction by referring to "battlespace" as including an
   "infosphere." 
[25] Bellamy (1987) grapples with some of these issues in
   his analysis of future land warfare. 
[26] Note that the acclaimed U.S.
   intelligence in Desert Storm rarely got to the division commanders; for
   them, every major encounter with the enemy's forces reportedly was a
   surprise. See Grier (1992). 
[27] Waltz (1979) considers this phenomenon
   of "imitation" a major factor in the process of "internal balancing"
   with which all nations are continually occupied. If a new military
   innovation is thought to work, all will soon follow the innovator. A
   good example of this is the abrupt and complete shift of the world's
   navies from wooden to metal hulls in the wake of the naval experience
   with ironclads in the American Civil War. 
[28] A classic example is the
   1944 battle for Normandy. Field Marshal Montgomery's forces tied down
   the German Seventh Army, allowing General Patton's Third Army to engage
   in a broad end run of the German defenses. 
[29] The authors are
   grateful to Gordon McCormick for his insights on this topic. Also on
   this point, see Arnett (1989). 
[30] This last point is inspired by the
   thinking of RAND colleague Ken Watman. 
[31] There is a class of
   proliferator toward which our reluctance to employ forceful measures
   will be diminished. Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Cuba are some of
   the nations whose threatened acquisition of weapons of mass destruction
   may justify intervention. The notion that the United States should
   adopt a doctrine of "selective preventive force" against "outlaw"
   states is discussed in Arquilla (1992a). 
[32] Arquilla (1992b)
   discusses this issue in detail. 
[33] This notion is drawn from the
   Korean War, where U.S. forces began their involvement by preventing the
   overrun of the Korean peninsula in the opening months of the war. The
   Pusan perimeter held a portion of South Korea free, serving as a magnet
   for North Korean forces. The amphibious counterattack at Inchon, far
   from the battle fronts, threw the invaders into complete disarray. 
[34]
   Kenney and Dugan (1992) call for a "Balkan Storm" without employing any
   American ground forces. We disagree with this approach, rooted as it is
   in theories of "limited liability" and "air power exceptionalism."
   Nonetheless, they do identify many of the key types of aerial cyberwar
   tactics that might be employed, even if their omission of an American
   ground component would seriously dilute any gains achieved.
  
   
   



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